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José Duque Quicios

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## The North American Intelligence Community: language management as a vital tool in generating safe and effective future intelligence

José Duque Quicios

General Directorate of the Guardia Civil, Madrid, Spain

### ABSTRACT

Information, prior to its transformation into intelligence, may be found in any of the languages currently spoken throughout the world. Although English is, in general, the main language used for global communication, it is no longer the principal language in which the most sensitive information, such as that concerning international organized crime and terrorism, is collected. This sought-after information is now found among the less common (and hence less well-studied) languages, as well as embedded within dialects and local nuances and inflections.

### KEYWORDS

international language cooperation; uncommon (minority) languages; language skills; intelligence; artificial intelligence; culture; language analysts

The intelligence communities, especially in the United States, are desperately trying to develop operational language skills in these minority languages. It is a slow process that requires substantial economic investment, is time-consuming, demands high levels of human resources, and involves not only public security and intelligence systems, but also the involvement of national educational and cultural organizations. Once the processing of this language-based knowledge is sufficiently mature, in terms of analyzing both the core natural language as well as its semantic and rhetorical nuances, it can then form part of a database of developing languages from which artificial intelligence will provide the necessary technological support to unlock its potential use for the Intelligence Community.

The purpose of this article is, essentially, to stress that the fundamental basis for developing strategic intelligence in the future is via embracing diverse language analysis and expanding its understanding. No other epistemic study is available that is based on a methodology of qualitative research of open-source material, coupled with 25 years of experience in international police cooperation, resulting in the author proposing systematic and strategic guidelines. Future articles will deal with tactical and operational levels of analysis, as well as the precise development of each section with indicators for their future expansion.

## Introduction

L. Wittgenstein said that the limits of our world are bounded by the limits of our language (Wittgenstein, 1918, 2016), and today also by multilingualism and multiculturalism (Joppke, 1998). What the Intelligence Community has come to refer to as SOCINT is, or should be, the central pillar of intelligence—over and above technological processes, its tools, big data, and even the personal visions of some intelligence experts. The fundamental epistemic and ontological constituents of any culture or civilization are defined by its language and religious identity. If words form a part of communication, then knowledge of culture is the other. Experience about an issue, especially if we talk about a foreign culture, cannot be acquired from a textbook or within a classroom. It is both experiential and experimental, and, to some degree, subjective.

However, the analysis of all of these parameters is fundamental, whether with regard to intelligence gathering, the fight against corporate espionage, or the creation of an international marketing campaign (Lawless, 2012).<sup>1</sup> Another factor is that communication experts tend to have vested interests, and in many cases lack the necessary field experience in institutional or prime business intelligence.

Historically, due to the economic, military, political, scientific, cultural, and colonial influence of Great Britain, from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, English has spread widely throughout the world and is the main language of international discourse and the *lingua franca* in many regions of the globe. But one thing is that this language is the language of formal global communication; the language of tactical and operational intelligence is quite another. In this last case, it is necessary to know some inflections and pragmatic uses of language that are not only in academic English, but in deviant or colloquial uses of this, even in dialects or “slang” of other languages. Methodologically, this complicates the task of intelligence and the use of slow and not adequate tools in linguistic subjects.

English is the primary language used in international legislation, regulation, the formulation of decrees, treaties, court decisions, and other official pronouncements; it has become the global language of business in recent times (language drives economic growth, creates jobs, and fosters competitiveness for US businesses).<sup>2</sup> English is also taught as a second language in many educational systems, and, over time, has imparted a degree of cultural superiority to those non-native speakers who have acquired it, due to the influential status of the Anglo-Saxon countries throughout the world. The English language is also the official language of the Commonwealth. But it is not the language of risk in security and intelligence.

But in a globalized world, risks are changing faster than at the pace at which we are able to learn languages. For this reason, international cooperation and

intelligence systems that place a priority on linguistics will be able to effectively address future risks.

Despite having fewer native speakers than Spanish, the strength of English is that it is the most studied language in the world, is spoken across five continents, and is the majority language in several of the most powerful countries (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, etc.).<sup>3</sup> Thus, to its 400 million native speakers, one must add more than 200 million people who have learned it. It is the most widely used language in business, international trade, and the Internet. For all of these reasons, it is not surprising that the United States is perhaps the only country in the world where it is considered that an individual has a well-rounded curriculum, yet only speaks their native language (Betts, 2002).

### **The United States recognizes their language deficiencies**

However, things are changing and evolving within North American models of security and intelligence (Duque, 2000; Duque, 2006). These language deficiencies in the United States, coupled with a lack of understanding of foreign cultures, have become apparent at national levels and this has caused the Department of Education, among other bodies, to set in motion the stimulation of language learning, including minority languages, and to introduce mechanisms to remedy these shortcomings. Great efforts are being made to promote educational and social integration to prevent future disaffection caused by a lack of social belonging. Therefore, the effective integration of different languages or cultural sensitivities is one of the most successful ways to minimize security risks.

Advances in technology and communications, new ways of doing business, political changes and instability, and a growing multicultural population in the United States are all challenges to the ability to interact effectively with people from all over the world. Health, police, social services, business, national security, and the role of the USA as a world leader are obliging people to be increasingly proficient in terms of their knowledge of foreign languages and cultures. And that in intelligence is called cultural and therefore linguistic cooperation, and this requirement in the search for language skills is known in the field of intelligence as cultural and linguistic cooperation.

The majority of the world's other languages would not be taught in the colleges and universities of the USA were it not for Federal Government programmes.<sup>4</sup> Because there is so little commercial support for the teaching of minority languages, the ability of the nation to teach and acquire language skills now relies heavily on the Language Resource Centre programme.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the complexity of the North American intelligence model, not even the influence of its security system (a phenomenon known as "Americanization") has been of sufficient importance to stimulate the understanding of languages

(Duque, 2008). The academic statistics for the year 2002 indicate that, across the entire nation, only 6 people graduated in Arabic studies, 183 in Chinese studies, and 339 in Russian. In 2007, not only this deficit in language proficiency, but also of foreign cultures, was acknowledged. The National Research Council claimed that:

A lack of knowledge of foreign languages and cultures threatens US security and its ability to compete in the market across a globalized world, and its citizenship should be well informed.<sup>6</sup>

In May 2009, there were only 3500 high schools in the USA that ran courses in minority languages, while Americans are interested in studying, in particular, Chinese, Arabic, Japanese, and Russian (Davidson, 2012).

Between 1995 and 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created a special unit consisting of 12 people to analyze intelligence concerning Bin Laden—the CIA Bin Laden Unit (Hinnen, 2010). But it suffered from a major problem: a lack of linguists. The same happened within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department, which lacked people native to the United States who spoke the necessary types of language or dialects fluently. Those born outside the USA could not normally achieve the required levels of security clearance in order to work in the world of counter-terrorist intelligence (Dickey, 2009).

In addition, military officers (across all ranks), including those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, have very little knowledge of Islam or its culture, and often fail to differentiate between Islam and extremist Islam. Due to the shortfalls in military training in terms of linguistic and cultural issues, our civil educational institutions also pay little attention to the religion, language, and the culture of the Middle East. Our information services categorize Muslims as being either secular or extremist, but do not differentiate between the secular and the radical (Goodman, 2013). Indeed, according to some experts, field operations and development manuals suffer from biased, partial, and ethnocentric visions, generating constant problems and misunderstandings.

### **The languages used by the United States throughout the world**

The United States has made many efforts in recent years to improve its language skills abroad, in particular by increasing the number of overseas posts which require specific knowledge of a language, by recruiting and hiring staff with foreign languages skills and providing incentivization.<sup>7</sup> The USA has developed a classification of languages in the world in accordance with its requirements.<sup>8</sup>

The State offers bonus points to Foreign Service candidates who can demonstrate mastery of certain languages, as well as promotion opportunities and economic incentives.<sup>9</sup> Regarding the Chinese language, junior Consular officers

now require knowledge of the language at level 2 (spoken) and level 0 (reading).<sup>10</sup> A study among junior officers currently serving in China revealed that most of them are not interested in the country due to language difficulties (GAO, 2006).<sup>11</sup>

As an example according to the Deputy Head of Mission in Sana'a, a spoken and reading qualification at Level 3 in Arabic does not provide staff with the necessary skills to participate in discussions about the foreign policy of the United States.<sup>12</sup>

All of the above reflects the reality within the intelligence agencies of a nation that wishes to assert itself in terms of global hegemony, but yet is hampered because, in common with the agencies of the rest of the Western world, it has always struggled to find personnel specialized in the languages used by Islamic terrorists (Duque, 2009). Until recently, there were few educational institutions in the United States that could generate graduates in Islamic languages.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the problems referred to above, the absence of motivated analyst and/or an inability to motivate or influence analysts sufficiently can render intelligence ineffective and cause serious errors in the application of security policies.

## **Languages and national security**

Foreign languages are a part of the “missing dimension” (and perhaps not considered nor appreciated as such until today), of intelligence, and this is partly responsible for the continuing invisibility of that discipline. During World War II, foreign languages were vital to the work of the Intelligence Community for message interception,<sup>14</sup> decoding, and the translation of intercepted documents.

Translating and the analysis of intelligence were inseparable, so both linguists and analysts worked closely together. Intelligence is not merely derived from a simple translation, in that “a linguistic translation of a message that lacks a deep understanding (such as the culture of who issued the message) is worse than not having that translation at all; and if the translation is poor, it can be even dangerous” (Footitt, 2010).

All of this points to a situation that until now has not been fully appreciated. The National Security Agency (NSA) reports that there are currently about 6500 languages spoken worldwide. It is a huge problem for the intelligence communities to find people who speak languages that are considered rare or infrequently used.<sup>15</sup> It is therefore very difficult to penetrate the networks of criminal or jihadist organizations, because Westerners are unfamiliar with the languages spoken within them. There is also the added problem that those who know them often present security, reliability, or recruitment challenges for intelligence services.

A large volume of information in many of these languages has accumulated and is stored untranslated, so that it ultimately ends up being destroyed. And the difficulty becomes especially apparent, as is the case in the United States which cannot monitor the millions of phone calls, emails, or intercepted monetary transactions, and it is recognized that only 10% of the whole mass of information is actually analyzed and processed (Denécé, 2014). Additional training is required to develop key skills in disciplines such as translation, localization, terminology, technology, engineering, or multimedia. They all come into play in order to communicate information between languages. For example, a competent Arabic analyst has to have these filters (e.g., a knowledge of the Arab culture), in order to fully understand a radio broadcast and to know whether what is being heard is important for security reasons, and then to translate it into good English (Lawless, 2012).

Within the CIA in 2001, only 20% of graduates had a fluent understanding of non-Latin languages, and after that date, there was no official within the organization who spoke Pashtun.<sup>16</sup> We also found that there was not enough staff to analyze the large volume of information on terrorism, as only 30% spoke the languages used most frequently by terrorists. At that time, the CIA had only four linguists who were fluent in the languages spoken in Afghanistan (Pashtun, Dari, Uzbek, and Turkmen) (Zegart, 2005).

This is not only an inherent problem within the US Intelligence community, but it is also suffered by other services due to their size, lack of resources, or political will; but it is not just the language difficulty that is a barrier to intelligence gathering, so too is the sheer volume of information that is intercepted daily. The NSA is the agency that has the greatest and best access to the plethora of telecommunication data that is emitted into the ether. A report by the Senate Intelligence Committee noted that only a small portion of the 650 million daily conversations intercepted by the NSA were actually listened to by a human being. The rest is lost in a stormy sea of data and information (Sorrells, 2008).

Witnesses to the *Joint Inquiry* reaffirmed the need for languages in counterterrorism analysis. Linguistic reports need to identify, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on threats from Al-Qaeda, including an understanding of colloquialisms in the languages and dialects used by terrorists, but there are still very few NSA graduates in Islamic studies (Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community, 2002).<sup>17</sup> According to the Assistant Director of Analysis of the NSA “to analyze, process and translate reports on Al-Qaeda on [————] requires a high level of language.” Topics such as explosives, chemical, technical communications, [————], paramilitary weapons, and tactical operations require a high level of language skill. Another barrier to cooperation and comprehensive intelligence vision is the minimal interdisciplinary training of its members. This is a major obstacle to cooperation

and integral vision in the field of intelligence, further complicated by the fact that there is no minimum interdisciplinary training among its members.

In today's US labor market, knowledge of languages has a future: advertisements appear such as "More than half a million federal employees will retire in 2016 leaving vacancies in the CIA, AmeriCorps or NASA. There will also be opportunities at the State and local levels with regards to police or security tasks."<sup>18</sup>

In the United States, there is a developmental program for speakers of their native (i.e., inherited) language, the *Heritage Language Speakers Programme*, geared such that speakers of (critical)<sup>19</sup> minority languages can improve their English and then work in Federal agencies, and it is advertised with the suggestive message "speakers of key languages are very much in demand in US Federal departments."<sup>20</sup>

### Languages spoken within the Intelligence Community

Of the 7000 languages spoken in the world, the US Intelligence Community collects and processes information on about 150, many of which are minor and rarely or never taught. Technological advances in communication and publishing throughout the world, and the ability to gather information in those languages, have exceeded the ability to process that information. Our challenge is to identify and obtain a competent human capacity to process that information, and then transform it into the necessary intelligence for those who have to make decisions at strategic and tactical levels. The lack of competence of the staff of the Intelligence Community is a barrier to the timely exploitation of the information during its shelf life.

The Intelligence Community linguists and analysts gather information in various formats (text, video, audio) and in different languages and dialects, and in order to do so they have developed and applied new language technologies—human language technologies (HLT). These technologies integrate sophisticated equipment, such as voice recognition, optical character recognition (OCR), and the automated translation of voice communication based on lexical couplets, all of which is analyzed by deep language experts. New reusable and shareable digital resources are being developed, such as glossaries and the multilingual parallel corpus that instructors, students, and technologists can use and share.

But although automated technology can facilitate and improve the implementation of human language skills, it cannot replace the need for foreign language skills in most of the analytical tasks or information gathering.<sup>21</sup> The challenge is to persuade linguists not to rely solely on the HLT resources, as they are obliged to do so today (Nordin, 2012).

Fortunately, and through an unprecedented effort, the Federal Government has brought about a national transformation by making language skills one of



the highest priorities of educational institutions, and as such, the language classes taught today in school language training courses, as previously outlined in this chapter, are very different from those taught previously in high schools and colleges.

In the longer term, we need to devote the time and effort to educate and transform the way in which our schools and universities teach foreign language and culture. Today's academic world will not generate, in the foreseeable future, the number of linguists required at the Federal, State, and local levels.

In order for the Intelligence Community to be truly successful, government and schools should also promote language learning alongside primary disciplines. Scientists and engineers can learn another language, in addition to their professional studies. In this sense, the nations of the world are placing greater emphasis on learning another language (usually English) among its scientists, doctors, engineers, and military personnel.

In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence released a strategic plan, the *IC Foreign Language Strategic Plan from 2012 to 2016*, regarding non-English speaking, with two overall objectives:

- To double the capacity of the Intelligence Community in the exploitation of foreign languages and the knowledge of minority languages by 2016.
- To ensure that 25% of the staff of the Intelligence Community posted abroad has obtained language level 2 skills (level of understanding) to use in that position: Language Roundtable (ILR) Level 2-Limited Proficiency (Nordin, 2012).

And of particular note, we can say that the United States wants to move on from only speaking English to embracing all the languages of the world over which, curiously, it permanently exerts influence (McGinn, 2014).

### **Foreign languages: some unknowns in the Federal security agencies**

Language skills are increasingly essential to the success of diplomatic efforts as well as military, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and intelligence missions, and also to permit access to Federal *Low English Proficiency* (LEP) programs and services within the United States (GAO, 2010).<sup>22</sup>

Consequently, Americans are beginning to invest in acquiring foreign language skills and also to recognize their current lack of language skills as being a part of a national security crisis (McGinn, 2014). But the key questions are how many languages? And which languages are most pertinent? How do we learn them?

In early 2004, the Department of Defense (DoD) launched a major initiative to fundamentally change its appraisal of foreign languages across the Army.

February 2005 saw the publication of a Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.

Conflict will not decrease against enemies who speak uncommon languages and those that we are not familiar with, and we therefore require knowledge of.

“Changes in the environment of international security and the nature of threats to US national security, have increased the extent of potential conflict zones, together with the number of likely coalition partners that American forces will be working with.”

And this new approach to warfighting in the twenty-first century will require forces to have knowledge of foreign languages beyond that generally available today (McGinn, 2014).

Over the last 10 years, four Federal agencies have been audited either by Congress hearings or by the Government Accountability Office (GAO),<sup>23</sup> with regard to the scope of their linguistic competences and requirements: The State Department, FBI, DoD, and DHS.

In 2010, the DoD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) testified before a Senate committee, at a hearing entitled “Closing the language gap: Improving foreign language skills in the Federal Government.”

The DHS described its needs as follows:

The DHS has a wide and varied need for foreign languages because of its broad deployment: the provision of emergency services to people with limited English proficiency, overseas research and interviewing foreigners when intercepted on ships. The mission of the Department ranges from people in the United States, who may lack English language skills, to nearly 2,200 employees deployed abroad. (McGinn, 2014)

The same office (GAO), in its report 10-715 dated July 29, 2010, evaluated foreign language needs and capabilities, identified potential shortfalls, and put forward programs and activities to mitigate possible deficits, submitting it to the DHS, DOD, and the Department of State.

From this report it is shown that:

- The DHS and its departments had not taken the necessary steps to identify potential deficits in foreign language skills. In addition, although a variety of programs and foreign language activities had been established, they had not assessed the extent to which these programs and activities had addressed possible shortcomings.
- The DoD had taken steps to transform their linguistic and regional competence capabilities, but had not developed a comprehensive strategic plan to channel its efforts.
- The State Department had been recommended to develop a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives, as well as

feedback mechanisms reflecting all of the efforts made by the State to meet their foreign language requirements.

As we can see, the agencies that were audited were not in the best conditions in terms of their core competence language skills, but at the end of the hearings, all accepted their shortcomings and the need to resolve them.

### **The Armed Forces also require better language skills**

The war against terrorism has factors which relate to having a high degree of skill in foreign languages (Aldrich, 2002). The lack of competent linguists decreased the overall efficiency of SIGINT in Afghanistan,<sup>24</sup> which resulted in the US Army training a large number of native speakers of languages such as Pashtun, Dari, and Urdu, although reports show that the levels of competence achieved have not been very high. A report by the US Army in 2003 noted that there was a requirement for staff not only to be fluent in these languages, but they also had to understand military and operational terminology. In fact, most of these personnel were workers and taxi drivers aged under 40, none of whom had previous military experience (Aid, 2006).

There were also problems with the collection of SIGINT military intelligence in Afghanistan. To counter its interception, the insurgents started using couriers and other non-imperceptible media.

The language used by terrorists is more complex than that used by the Armed Forces; this is easily understandable because communication between these, whether electronically or face to face, makes use of colloquial idioms and slang words that are alien to those not immersed in their culture, and for these reasons, the level of language knowledge required is set at level 3/3.

Two lists of these languages have been established:

- Modern and Maghreb Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun, Afghan, Azeri, Punjabi, Sindhi, Saraiki, and Urdu (Aldrich, 2002).
- Another for linguists: Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkoman (UB), Tajiki, Brahui, and Hindko/Hazaragi.

Once this language deficiency was noted, the DoD pursued an aggressive agenda to improve its capacity, which would involve more than 3 million members in active and reserve service, and so in June 2004, the DoD, in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Study of Language of the University of Maryland, convened the National Conference on Language. This conference brought together:

Leaders of Federal and State government agencies, academic institutions and industry representatives, international experts on language and linguistic researchers, to discuss and lay out the groundwork for an initial strategic approach to meeting the language needs of the nation in the twenty-first century. (McGinn, 2014)

A White Paper was published which included recommendations for the Federal Government and a general recommendation for the National Council of Foreign Languages, in order to identify critical priorities, inform national leaders of the seriousness of the lack of foreign language skills, and increase public awareness of the need for greater understanding of foreign languages in relevant careers in business and government, to promote the maximum utilization of resources and to coordinate intersectoral efforts.<sup>25</sup>

In May 2005, Senator Daniel Akaka, a constant advocate of the need to improve foreign language capacities across the country, presented the 2005 National Coordination of Foreign Languages Act (McGinn, 2014).

In order to match these needs against the stated objectives, the Army has the following set of institutions:

- The *Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center* (DLIFLC),<sup>26</sup> which was initially overloaded, considering the participation of US Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (McGinn, 2014).
- The *National Language Service Corps*, NLSC, one of the innovations of the DoD, as part of the National Security Language Initiative. It is a civilian body of reserve linguists, comprising a number of Americans with language abilities who are “on call” to respond to the language needs of all Federal agencies. Today, that body has more than 4500 members with the capacity to engage in more than 290 languages, and administratively, they are seconded as temporary Federal employees on intermittent work programs (McGinn, 2014).
  - The NSA’s (Strategic Human Capital Plan, 2006)<sup>27</sup> *National Cryptologic School*<sup>28</sup>
  - The *State Department’s Foreign Service Institute*<sup>29</sup>
  - The CIA’s *Intelligence Language Institute*,<sup>30</sup> which, in 2005, launched a program focused on the Chinese and Arab languages (Strategic Human Capital, 2006).<sup>31</sup>

The most effective means of gathering information was not to pose direct questions to targeted individuals, but to form relationships with them. The problem was that counterespionage staff were not versed enough in Pashtun and had to work through intermediaries and interpreters, which distorted the conversation. After the first 2 years of the Global War on Terrorism, the linguistic situation was far from satisfactory. Only when the rest of the Special Forces Groups and representatives of other government agencies

could converse with locals in these exotic languages, with the degree of fluency that, for example, made the 7th Group so successful with Spanish in Latin America, could there develop an authentic human information flow in sufficient quantities to be useful (Kaplan, 2005).

Language had to become an occupational skill set for the Special Forces in the same way as was weaponry, communications, medicine, and information gathering. It was necessary to identify and cultivate people with linguistic abilities throughout the breadth of the bureaucratic system. It was important to give them the specialist personal tools which would enable them to overcome specific obstacles, but these tailor-made practices were alien to an army whose training system was entrenched and overregulated.

Sometimes the effectiveness of an army clashes with efficiency in certain tasks, especially in Intelligence. And at this point it is necessary to highlight that, at times, the effectiveness of an army clashes with efficiency in certain tasks, especially in Intelligence.

In the Middle East and the Pacific, where numerous languages and dialects are spoken, it was necessary to have a combination of language skills within each A<sup>32</sup> team, such that wherever a team was deployed, it contained at least one or two people who could speak the local language (Kaplan, 2005).

An instructor was speaking to a group of marines who were about to deploy to the southern Balkans:

You have a meeting, say at 9.30 h in the morning, with the town mayor. He will turn up at ten, if he feels like it. His office is a wreck. You need his cooperation for something, but he will be more interested in what you can do for him. Do not regard it as a meeting with a preset time-frame. Do not set about discussing US policy objectives in the former Yugoslavia. He will likely as not be keener to discuss professional basketball. The people in this part of the world love basketball. Ask to see pictures of his family. Always carry photos of your own families to these meetings. If you are offered *slivovitz*, don't get hung up about the fact that drinking is against the rules. Drink with him. He will wish to probe you, to feel comfortable with you, before wanting to assist you. It's quite possible that you won't get to leave his office before eleven, and quite possibly without having reached any agreement; you may have to get to know his family, play with their kids and drink with him a few times before you get to that stage. You will then only get him to agree to endorse or apply measures related to him, as an individual and at his level. And that's what Americans do best. (Kaplan, 2005)

### **New York Police Department: collecting information for processing into intelligence about the ethnic and linguistic diversity of their community**

You cannot engender or cultivate informants in migrant communities, let alone develop police infiltration within them, unless one is conversant with their languages. The members of a Mexican cartel won't express themselves

with any great confidence if the interlocutor speaks to them in Spanish with a Caribbean accent.

David Cohen, at a morning meeting, presented a list of 15 required languages and dialects in order of priority: Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Fukinese, Dari, and Bengali. As a result, 2500 functionaries within the police registered themselves as having the necessary language skills.<sup>33</sup>

This is one of the reasons why cooperation between different law enforcement agencies is essential to obtain operational, tactical, and strategic intelligence.

Arabic is crucial to the fight against terrorism. In 2006, out of a total of 12,000 FBI agents only 33 had any knowledge of Arabic. On the other hand, the New York Police Department (NYPD) had twice that number of policemen who spoke Arabic fluently (Dickey, 2009).<sup>34</sup>

In 2002, the total number of Arabic graduates in the United State amounted to only six. Around the same time, Cohen found that more than 70 of his police officers spoke Arabic fluently, and in 2003, the NYPD had more than 600 linguists. This contrasted with the fact that at the end of 2006, 3 years after the US invasion of Iraq, the largest US embassy in the world (in Baghdad, with almost 1000 employees) had only 33 personnel who spoke Arabic, and only six of these did so with any degree of fluency.

According to Cohen (Dickey, 2009), the language skills of the NYPD are unique and have come about as a result of the size and diversity within the city, and in order to exploit this situation, Commissioner Kelly<sup>35</sup> wrote to the CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and NSA offering to share linguists across the board (Dickey, 2009). This NYPD capability, arising from the demands of its operational environment, has potential application not only for the intelligence field and to protect national security, but also for tracking intelligence trends and anticipating international security risks. There is no longer a separation between internal security and international security, as both have become one and the same.

But linguistic skills are not only necessary for the more operational reasons, but are also important for normal day-to-day relations with the community. Currently, the NYPD's Community Affairs Bureau takes advantage of the linguistic potential of its staff, and its *New Immigrant Outreach Liaison Unit* is dedicated to developing closer communication with immigrants, periodically organizing presentations, lessons, and regular meetings regarding the latest regulations affecting this sensitive sector of the city. Being able to speak in the languages of those attending the meetings facilitates and improves relationships (NYPD Language Access Plan, 2012).<sup>36</sup>

The New York Police recognizes the importance of having effective and appropriate communications with the population it serves. And accordingly, it must understand the citizens who seek help on the Street, yet whose English proficiency is poor (NYPD Language Access Plan, 2012).<sup>37</sup>

The *Mayor's Executive Order 120 of 22 July 2008*, signed by Mayor Bloomberg, created a centralized language access policy for New York City, which obliges all municipal agencies that provide direct public services to citizens whose mother tongue is not English or have difficulty understanding it,<sup>38</sup> to have in place an appropriate language plan to facilitate access to their services.<sup>39</sup>

In this sense, the NYPD falls squarely within this policy directive and must determine those areas that this order considers to comprise residential zones whose inhabitants have a poor understanding of English, LEP<sup>40</sup>; in other words, districts where 25% of residents do not have English as their mother tongue, or who do not speak, write, or understand English well. Within these areas, NYPD has identified the six most widely spoken languages and introduced them as part of their services: Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Haitian Creole, Russian, and Italian.

During 2010, the NYPD received 11,052,108 emergency 911 phone calls, of which 267,990 (i.e., 2%) required translation. Of these, 59% were in Spanish. Since 2007 to this date, calls to the 911 call system were made in 85 different languages, but the three most frequent languages were Spanish 89%, Chinese 6%, and Russian 2% (NYPD Language Access Plan, 2012).<sup>41</sup>

Looking beyond the United States in order to see the importance of police communication-cooperation with the different ethnic communities, the state of Victoria<sup>42</sup> (Australia) has established *Cultural Diversity and Linguistics Communities* (CDLC Communities). The police in this state have established a series of liaison links with these communities and, through their policies of rapprochement and cooperation (Victoria Police 2003-2008),<sup>43</sup> have managed to establish special relations with them, within their Police and Community Multicultural Advisory Committee (Pickering, McCulloch, & Wright-Neville, 2008).<sup>44</sup>

With all of this background in mind, in 2009 the NYPD created its *Language Access Plan*, which is monitored and updated on an annual basis, and from which one can affirm that the NYPD is the police force that, given their diversity of origin, has the most officers speaking the greatest variety of languages in their day-to-day duties in the world.

The NYPD has more than 1200 police officers who speak some 85 different languages (Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, John J. Miller, New York City Police Department, 2014):<sup>45</sup> Spanish is in first place,<sup>46</sup> followed by hundreds who speak Chinese (in its various dialects), and then other less common languages such as Russian, Korean, Polish, Arabic, Urdu, French, Bengali, Japanese, Creole, or Italian—and in addition, US sign-language.

Within its volunteer translator's initiative, the Department maintains records of members who, albeit without formal qualification, can be called upon when required (they number about 1400). On the other hand, when formal language certification is required, the Department can draw upon approximately 1100 official translators, whose competences are accredited by Berlitz-Geneva Co.

There is also a city-wide service called *Language Line*, which is available both in police premises and out on patrol, which provides access to a simultaneous translation service via dual handset telephones.<sup>47</sup>

Many Federal, State, and local police departments turn to the NYPD when they urgently require these types of services, which is logical given its comprehensive availability and deployment throughout the city.

As can easily be seen, such language capabilities greatly facilitate the NYPD in fulfilling its tasks, whether in regard to community relations, crime, or terrorism, so therefore it is stated that:

*The New York Police speak the language of their city*<sup>48</sup>

With all of this linguistic background, it is not surprising that the next steps for the future are as esoteric as currently stated in its website.<sup>49</sup>

### **FBI: the linguistic Intelligence Community**

The FBI has always had difficulty in recruiting staff that are fluent in languages, which is essential in intelligence gathering allied to the fight against terrorism (Posner, 2006).<sup>50</sup> In the Audit Report 04 of July 25, 2004, it was stated that 3 years after 9/11, they still had on file more than 12,000 h of recordings potentially related to terrorism, but that had not yet been translated, and this was exacerbated by the fact that technical computer issues had caused some recordings emanating from Al-Qaeda to be deleted (Posner, 2005).<sup>51</sup>

The FBI's Language Services Section, LSS, is responsible for meeting the foreign language requirements of the Bureau itself, the Police Community, and also the Police Intelligence Community.<sup>52</sup> Their services extend to the recruitment and training (if any) of translators, producing the translations themselves and interpreting everything else related to this field. This program has identified and prioritized needs, the latter demonstrating a steady increase in requirements.

The LSS, created in January 1999, can count on 1400 linguists who are distributed throughout Washington (Tromblay, 2016), its 56 regional offices, and those deployed to embassies.<sup>53</sup> Since 9/11, the staff have increased in number to more than 800 linguists and 100 language analysts.<sup>54</sup> Since then, the number of linguists has increased by 85%, and this incrementation has been in high-priority languages: Arabic 261%, Urdu 733%, and Farsi 142%. At present, the staff complement comprises 1400 linguists, 600 language analysts, and 800 hired civilian contract personnel, to which can be added about 40 more personnel annually, in order to cover staff turnover, sick leave, etc. The entry tests are rigorous and only one in ten applicants obtains a contract.<sup>55</sup>

This service also includes the participation of some 3000 FBI employees who have a good knowledge of foreign languages, who are granted a professional accreditation, and who are paid a financial incentive.



## National Virtual Translation Center

The National Virtual Translation Center was designated as a service of common concern to the Intelligence Community in September 2014. This was created in response to the *Patriot Act* in 2001 and is part of the Intelligence Community under the supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.<sup>56</sup> Since 2003, the FBI has been its executive agency, which is responsible for the background checks conducted on incoming personnel as well as its administrative support.<sup>57</sup>

In actual fact, the center acts as a contractor which can make use of resources from all of the Federal agencies, as the FBI does when their linguists are already occupied or are overloaded with work.

This center is not organized as a typical government department, because its members are distributed throughout the country,<sup>58</sup> and some work from home, even part time, according to fluctuating work requirements. Its philosophy is to exploit the capacity of those who have language skills wherever they happen to live, without having to move to Washington to work.<sup>59</sup>

Only 30% of American high school students and 8% in post-secondary education study a foreign language (in 1960 the latter figure was 17%), which is a handicap for the multilingual societies with which the United States competes. Two-thirds of Americans between 18 and 24 years of age do not know how to locate Iraq on a map of the Middle East. (Ochoa, 2012)

Currently, this service comprises 1400 linguists, of which 600 are language analysts and 800 are hired staff. Since 9/11, the FBI increased its complement by 800 new linguists and hired about 100 new language analysts, responsible for meeting the following language requirements: Arabic (Yemen), Chinese, Farsi, Pashto, and Somali (McGinn, 2014).

It has adopted a “model of workforce planning,” recruiting staff to address those language gaps that are deemed to in “deficit or for which a future need is anticipated.” As for the DoD, the FBI has identified about 2000 among its own employees with language skills that can be called upon if necessary, and who also receive an incentive for their services (McGinn, 2014).

## Conclusions

The US Intelligence Community and Federal security agencies (and also its operations in major countries) have for some time engaged in a frantic race to make up for lost time and knowledge in the field of linguistics, as has been explained in this article. All conceivable material and human resources have been made available for this purpose, which has not only focused on the knowledge of languages themselves, but also on the cultures from which they emanate. And to these ends, the nation has committed not only its public security and intelligence agencies but also its educational and cultural

organizations. Once this knowledge is properly collected and transformed into intelligence, it will then be introduced into the field of artificial intelligence which is being developed in the context of linguistics (multilingualism, automatic translators of text and voice, OCRs, and in its more advanced state, automated profile recognition based on written and spoken traces, known as digital fingerprinting), all of which is somewhat imperfect today and represents an ambition for the future.

We remain uneasy if we encounter any messages that we cannot understand that might contain sensitive information (in written format rather than referring to sound), even though it appears to be written in a Western language; but when this same information is presented in a Semitic or oriental language without even the possibility of obtaining a bad machine translation, the feeling of helplessness is total.

But we should keep in mind that the efforts that we are making to make good these deficiencies are also known to our adversaries. If we correct these deficiencies, we can achieve that recovery. But what about them? Are they going to stand still, waiting for us to catch up with them? Surely not, and perhaps they are also already on the move to keep one step ahead. So therefore, can we get to catch up with them someday? And to these questions, which are somewhat rhetorical, have already appeared some answers: the terrorists have also entered the world of linguistics and seek translators (e.g., Spanish and Portuguese), so that their messages can reach their goals and in our own languages (EL MUNDO, 2016).<sup>60</sup>

The lack of vision in some areas of the Intelligence Community, or its managers, or failures among the non-technical public or private administrators of the intelligence community, might lead us to think that the risks are greater due to inaction than through capability and knowledge.

## Notes

1. Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. (2012). *S. HRG. 112-663: A National Security Crisis: Foreign Language Capabilities in the Federal Government*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20.
2. *Ibid.*
3. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/266808/the-most-spoken-languages-worldwide/>;  
<http://www.englishlanguageguide.com/facts/stats/>.
4. For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RL31625, *Foreign Language and International Studies: Federal Aid Under Title VI of the Higher Education Act*, by Jeffrey J. Kuenzi.
5. In 1990, the Department of Education established the first *Language Resource Centers* (LRCs) in US universities, a home response to a growing national need for knowledge and skills in minority languages. More than 20 years later, there are 15 LRCs with grants funded under higher education legislation, which have formed a national framework of resources to improve the teaching and learning of foreign languages.

Currently, there are 15 language centers in as many American universities, which provide the resources to support the study of minority languages—currently so relevant to the fight against terrorism; see *Language Resource Centers* (LRC) [http://www.nflrc.org/lrc\\_broc\\_full.pdf](http://www.nflrc.org/lrc_broc_full.pdf).

6. H.R. 4628 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2003; National Flagship Language Initiative, Section 333, D, about education: (1) under the National Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher education shall establish, operate, or improve activities designed to train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies to be the most critical in the interests of the national security of the United States.
7. The State has increased the number of overseas postings requiring language skills by 27%. In 2001, there were 2581 overseas posts (29% of the total) that mandated specific languages. In October 2005, there were 3267 overseas posts (43% of the total) that required specific foreign language skills. These posts span 69 different languages.
8. **Normal languages:** Afrikaans, Danish, Dutch, French, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, and Swedish. **Very difficult languages:** Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Arabic. **Difficult languages:** Albanian, Amharic (Ethiopian), Armenian, Azeri, Bengali, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Burmese, Byelorussian, Croatian, Czech, Estonian, Finnish, Georgian, Greek, Hindi, Hungarian, Icelandic, Kazakh, Khmer, Kurd, Kyrgyz, Loa, Latvian, Lithuanian, Macedonian, Malay, Mongolian, Nepali, Pashto, Persian (Dari, Farsi, Tajiki), Polish, Russian, Serbian, Sinhalese, Slovak, Slovenian, Tagalog, Tamil, Thai, Turkish, Turkmen, Ukrainian, Urdu, Uzbek, Vietnamese, Xhosa, and Zulu.
9. In the Middle East, a region of great importance during the War on Terrorism, 37% of overseas posts were occupied by personnel without the necessary language skills. This shortfall was even greater in certain other critical postings: 50% in Cairo, Egypt, and 50% in Sana'a, Yemen.
10. With these levels, one can ask the necessary questions during a consular interview but not always understand the replies. Consular officials sometimes granted visas in error due to language difficulties, as they would issue them without fully understanding the responses given by the applicants being interviewed.
11. United States Government Accountability Office, *Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations*, U.S. Senate. GAO-06-894, August 2006.
12. For example: an Embassy spokesman was only able to participate in an hour-long media program, which was conducted entirely in Arabic, due to the fact that he held a level 4 Arabic qualification.
13. In 2002, there were only two graduates.
14. During the spring of 1944, British Naval Intelligence processed an average of 18,000 translations.
15. UNESCO is unable to verify this number but it is estimated to be between 6000 and 8000. See UNESCO World Report, (2009), *Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue*.
16. The dialect used by the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan.
17. U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001*, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), 343–344.
18. Gandel, C., 9 Recession-Proof Careers, *Readers Digest*. Retrieved from <http://www.rd.com/money/9-recessionproof-careers>.

19. Amharic, Arabic, Balochi, Bambara/Bamana, Dari, Hausa, Hindi, Kazakh, Kurdish, Kyrgyz, Mandarin, Pashto, Persian, Farsi, Punjabi, Somali, Tajik, Tamasheko, Turkish, Urdu, and Yoruba.
20. English for Heritage Language Speakers (2005). Retrieved from <http://www.ehlsprogram.org/>.
21. Intelligence Community Needs More language specialists. 2 March 2007 by Steven Rothberg, <https://www.collegerecruiter.com/blog/2007/03/02/intelligence-community-needs-more-language-specialists/>;  
Intelligence Community Directive 630. Signed by Director of National Intelligence on 14-5-2012, <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/readersrespond/bs-ed-rr-sept-20170912-story.html>;  
<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/merrymar44%40gmail.com/15f35a9ba23d8894?projector=1>;  
CIA Director Calls for a National Commitment to Language Proficiency at Foreign Language Summit. 8 December 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2010/foreign-language-summit.html>;  
Ensuring Language Capability in the Intelligence Community, by Asch, Beth J. and John D. Winkler [https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/TR1284.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1284.html);  
HR4573-108°Congress (2003–2004). Intelligence Community Language Capabilities Enhancement Act of 2004. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/4573/all-info>  
§3201. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence community, <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section3201&num=0&edition=prelim>;  
Understanding the Written Foreign language. Something as simple as matching names in an intelligence database can help fight terrorism. 1 October 2013. Robert K. Ackerman <https://www.afcea.org/content/?q=understanding-%E2%80%A8the-written-%E2%80%A8foreign-language> .
22. United States Government Accountability Office. *Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State Could Better Assess Their Foreign Language Needs and Capabilities and Address Shortfalls*, U.S. Senate GAO-10-715T, 29 July 2010.
23. Independent Agency, not subject to any party and reporting to Congress.
24. Intelligence gathering by means of signal interception.
25. White Paper: Ingold, C. W., & Wang, S. C. (2010). *The teachers we need: Transforming world language education in the United States*. College Park, MD: National Foreign Language Center at the University of Maryland. Retrieved from: [http://www.nflc.org/publications/the\\_teachers\\_we\\_need.pdf](http://www.nflc.org/publications/the_teachers_we_need.pdf).
26. This is the basic center for language training within the DoD, running intensive courses of 12 to 63 weeks in length. Although it is run by the DoD, it comprises teachers and students from all of the Armed Forces and Marines, who also provide instruction to members of the Federal Agencies of the Administration, as well police throughout the country. It offers instruction in Afrikaans, classic Arabic, Dari, Mandarin Chinese, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Kurmanji, Pashto, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Kurdish, Serbo-Croat, Spanish, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, Urdu, Uzbek, and Iraqi dialects.
27. Strategic Human Capital Plan. An Annex to the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy. (22 June 2006). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, June, 22, 2006, 23.
28. Apart from specific training in cryptology, it also offers (whether to military or civilian members of the NSA) training courses in foreign languages, which are accredited by the other American educational institutions.

29. Belonging to the State Department, this is the Federal Government's basic training institution for its foreign affairs staff, diplomats, and civilian support officers. In its linguistics field, it offers instruction in 70 foreign languages to more than 100,000 people per year, both for the State Department and the Armed Forces.
30. The CIA has a comprehensive program for the training and understanding of foreign languages, for which it makes use of native speakers and the latest technology in order to teach up to 16 different languages. Afterward, there are generous incentivization schemes whereby those who attain good levels of proficiency can achieve bonuses of up to 35,000 USD.
31. Strategic Human Capital, and Annex to the US National Intelligence Strategy, 22-06-06, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, p. 23.
32. They were close air support units, consisting of three men (two Special Forces soldiers and an embedded Air Force specialist). These three operators would crouch behind an earth mound and set up their equipment: a rubber-coated optical sight and a laser illuminator that looked like a set of tripod mounted binoculars. The illuminator emitted a beam centered on the target, so that a laser-guided bomb could be directed onto it from high altitudes.
33. He was the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence for the NYPD, and was the first to be appointed to that position, as part of the response to the 9/11 attacks. Before that, he had been the Deputy Director for Operations of the CIA.
34. Dickey, C. *Op. cit.*, pp. 141–159.
35. Raymond Walter Kelly was the longest serving commissioner in the history of the NYPD and the first person to hold the post for two nonconsecutive tenures. Kelly had spent 47 years in the NYPD, serving in 25 different commands and as Police Commissioner from 1992 to 1994 and again from 2002 until 2013. Kelly was the first person to rise from Police Cadet to Police Commissioner, holding all of the department's ranks.
36. NYPD Language Access Plan. (June 14, 2012), New York Police Department, 12.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
38. This executive order reckons that there are 3.4 million immigrants and 1.8 others with a limited understanding of English.
39. One part of this municipal order prescribes *Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*, and the other, the general laws on crime control, namely the *Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968*, which prohibit discrimination for motives of race, color, or nationality by those organizations that receive Federal funding. In this sense, all police departments that receive funding from the Department of Justice (DOJ) are subject to these requirements, as well as other Civil Rights legislation.
40. To be specific, this covers a number of factors that have been used by the DOJ, among which is the demographic analysis of the relevant area or neighborhood.
41. NYPD Language Access Plan. *Op. cit.* p. 4.
42. Victoria is the most culturally diverse state in Australia. Nearly a quarter of Victoria's population was born abroad and more than 20% have a father who was born overseas. The citizens of Victoria originate from more than 200 different countries, speak more than 230 languages, and follow some 120 different religions. The majority of the population of Victoria that was born abroad arrived in Australia as immigrants seeking a better life for themselves and their children. A significant number arrived in Australia as refugees—first, Europeans who had been displaced during the World War II, later on, refugees from the Indo-China wars, and most recently, fleeing from the conflicts in the Republic of the Former-Yugoslavia, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.
43. The Way Ahead Strategic Plan 2003–2008. Victoria Police. Melbourne, Australia. Retrieved from [http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?Document\\_ID=14021](http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?Document_ID=14021).

44. Pickering, S., McCulloch, J. y Wright-Neville, D. (2008). *Counter-Terrorism Policing. Community, Cohesion and Security*, Nueva York: Springer, 2008, 79–82, and Multicultural Police Statement (2008), Victoria Police, 2008.
45. Testimony by the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, John J. Miller, NYPD, appearing before The New York City Council Committees on Public Safety and Fire and Criminal Justice Services, 12 November 2014.
46. One out of four has a Spanish language grade, some 27%; see NYPD Language Access Plan, *Op. cit.* p. 8.
47. Although American legislation is very rigid, the NYPD uses these methods because there are no Federal laws or regulations that prevent the use of non-certified foreign language speakers.
48. [http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/news/news\\_foreign\\_lang\\_outreach.shtml](http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/news/news_foreign_lang_outreach.shtml).
49. Baluchi, Cambodian, Chechen, Fula (Fulani), Indonesian, Kurdish, Laotian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Somali, Swahili, Swedish, Twi (Akan), and Wolof. See: <http://www.nypdrecruit.com/inside-nypd/language-opportunities>.
50. Posner, R. A. (2006). *Uncertain Shield. The US Intelligence System in the throes of Reform*, Nueva York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 111.
51. Posner, R. A. (2005). *Remaking Domestic Intelligence*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 43.
52. In 2004, it had a budget of 66.1 million USD while in 2008 this budget had reduced to 43.8 Million USD.
53. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Language Translation Program. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Audit Division. Audit Report 10-02. October 2009.
54. During the fiscal year 2008, the FBI covered 878.383 h of foreign language and English in audio alone, 1.610.091 pages of text, and 795.212 electronic files. During this audit (audit Report 10-02 of October 2009) one finds that between fiscal years 2006 and 2008 between 25% and 31% of the material was not reviewed. The FBI maintains that this material could not be analyzed because of a lack of personnel or insufficient linguistic capability. In the fiscal year 2007, the FBI only had linguists in 17 out of the 42 languages that were set in their objectives. Regarding *Security accreditation*, those linguists who deal with terrorism and counterterrorism matters must have a security accreditation rated at Top Secret, renewed every 5 years.
55. It is very difficult to find the appropriate personnel. Apart from being subjected to polygraph tests and background checks, they must have a good understanding of English.
56. H.R.3162, THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, Title IX Section 907, National Virtual Translation Center, United States Code Title 50, Section 3361—National Virtual Translation Center, and The Economy Act of 1932—Provide Services to U.S. Government Entities.
57. These must be US citizens who have been cleared through very rigorous background checks, including polygraph analysis, and have passed a test in language comprehension.
58. Some 114 locations, whether in the United States or overseas.
59. <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch/national-virtual-translation-center>.
60. Lázaro, F. (1 August 2016). El ISIS ficha traductores para amenazar a España en la red. *El Mundo*. Retrieved from <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2016/08/01/579e49f6468aeb47138b45e5.html>.

## Notes on contributor

José Duque Quicios, Colonel, Spanish Guardia Civil, was deputy director for International Cooperation and Managing editor of the professional in-house magazine 'Guardia Civil'. Served in a WEU Embargo mission as Chief, Spanish-German contingent, Bulgaria, and in a joint French PHARE project, reorganising the Romanian Gendarmerie. He developed an ethics code for the Romanian and Russian Gendarmerie under a Council of Europe mandate and collaborated with the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit. Over thirty years, he researched global police and intelligence systems, publishing extensively, including coordinating a police-intelligence legal glossary covering 53 languages, working with more than 160 collaborators.

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