Property-liability insurer reserve error : motive, manipulation, or mistake

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<title>Property-liability insurer reserve error</title>
<subTitle>: motive, manipulation, or mistake</subTitle>
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<namePart>Grace, Martin F</namePart>
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<placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">esp</placeTerm>
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<dateIssued encoding="marc">2012</dateIssued>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of the reserve error. We find strong evidence that financially weak insurers underreserve to a greater extent than other insurers. However, our evidence casts doubt on the conclusion that insurers manipulate reserves to avoid solvency monitoring. We also find insurers increase reserves for tax purposes and to reduce the impact of regulatory rate suppression.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Martin F. Grace, J. Tyleer Leverty</note>
<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080586294">
<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080624934">
<topic>Seguro de daños patrimoniales</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080548575">
<topic>Pérdidas</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080548766">
<topic>Property</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080582340">
<topic>Reservas técnicas</topic>
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<classification authority="">32</classification>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
<part>
<text>04/06/2012 Volumen 79 Número 2  - junio 2012 , p. 351-380</text>
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