Government intervention through an implicit federal backstop : Is there a link to market power?

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<dc:creator>Eckles, David L.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2015-07-06</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: We estimate the impact of exogenous capital shocks, namely the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), on prices in various property-casualty business lines. We hypothesise that these capital shocks may distort insurer incentives. Specifically, insurers may exploit the implicit governmental guaranty by taking additional pricing risks in order to gain market share. Our results do not support this hypothesis. We find no evidence of a company-specific, or industry-wide, moral hazard problem associated with the implicit (explicit, in some cases) federal backstop created by TARP funds.

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<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/153265.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Government intervention through an implicit federal backstop : Is there a link to market power?</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 06/07/2015 Volumen 40 Número 3 - julio 2015 </dc:relation>
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