Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection

Notas: This article take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. Investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contract. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contract where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidentsRegistros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ; p. 45-59Materia / lugar / evento: Contrato de seguro Mercado de seguros Empresas de seguros Métodos de análisis Matemática del seguro Cálculo actuarial Otros autores: Karamychev, Vladimir A.
Títulos secundarios: Título: The Journal of risk and insurance
Otras clasificaciones: 6

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