Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Moral hazard and long-term care insurance

Notas: Sumario: In private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard.

Registros relacionados: En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 01/04/2019 Volumen 44 Número 2 - abril 2019 , p. 231-251Materia / lugar / evento: Seguro de dependencia Productos de seguros Evaluación de riesgos Riesgo moral Otros autores: Konetzka, R. Tamara
Otras clasificaciones: 34

Derechos: In Copyright (InC)

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