Bonus options in health insurance

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Zweifel, Peter</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Waser, Otto</dc:creator>
<dc:date>1992</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthky premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/10322.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:publisher>Kluwer Academic Publishers</dc:publisher>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de enfermedad</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Costes económicos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Financiación</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Casos prácticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Alemania</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Livros</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Bonus options in health insurance</dc:title>
<dc:format xml:lang="es">141 p. ; 25 cm</dc:format>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">Developments in health economics and public policy ; v. 2</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Alemania</dc:coverage>
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