Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Yin, Haitao</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Pfaff, Alex</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Kunreuther, Howard</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments-ex post fines an dris management mandates with ex ante fines-do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatroy agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/128616.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Gerencia de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Análisis de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgos medioambientales</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Risk analysis : an international journal. - McLean, Virginia : Society for Risk Analysis, 1987-2015 = ISSN 0272-4332. - Tomo 31 Número 1 - 2011</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>