Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection
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100 | 1 | $0MAPA20080189150$aCrocker, Keith J. | |
245 | 0 | 0 | $aMultidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection$cKeith J. Crocker, Arthur Snow |
520 | $aBundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the RothschildStiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible. | ||
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080616984$aEstudios de investigación | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080553630$aCoberturas | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080584290$aContrato de seguro | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080609788$aComunicación del riesgo | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080619992$aObligaciones del asegurado | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080599096$aSelección de riesgos | |
650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080582661$aSelección adversa | |
700 | 1 | $0MAPA20090003781$aSnow, Arthur | |
773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2 - 2011 |