Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection

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<title>Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection</title>
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<namePart>Crocker, Keith J.</namePart>
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<namePart>Snow, Arthur</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the RothschildStiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible. </abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Keith J. Crocker, Arthur Snow</note>
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<topic>Contrato de seguro</topic>
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<topic>Comunicación del riesgo</topic>
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<topic>Obligaciones del asegurado</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080599096">
<topic>Selección de riesgos</topic>
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<topic>Selección adversa</topic>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
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<text>01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2  - 2011 </text>
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