| LDR | | | 00000cam a22000004b 4500 |
| 001 | | | MAP20130037448 |
| 003 | | | MAP |
| 005 | | | 20131111171408.0 |
| 008 | | | 131111s2012 che|||| ||| ||eng d |
| 040 | | | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP |
| 084 | | | $a34 |
| 100 | 1 | | $0MAPA20130016122$aJanssens, Wendy |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | $aThe Social dilemma of microinsurance$b: a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups$cWendy Janssens and Berber Kramer |
| 260 | | | $aGeneva$bInternational Labour Organization$c2012 |
| 490 | 0 | | $aMicroinsurance paper$v22 |
| 520 | | | $aThis paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance |
| 650 | | 1 | $0MAPA20080563394$aMicroseguros |
| 650 | | 4 | $0MAPA20080618421$aSeguro colectivo de salud |
| 650 | | 4 | $0MAPA20080588069$aSistema individual |
| 651 | | 1 | $0MAPA20130016146$aTanzania |
| 700 | 1 | | $0MAPA20130016139$aKramer, Berber |
| 710 | 2 | | $0MAPA20080455859$aInternational Labour Organization |
| 710 | 2 | | $0MAPA20090043008$aMicro Insurance Innovation Facility |
| 830 | | 0 | $0MAPA20100040225$aMicroinsurance paper$v22 |
| 856 | | | $uhttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/mifacility/download/repaper22.pdf |
| 856 | | | $qimage/jpeg$w1075747$yPortada |
