Does the threat of insurer liability for "Bad Faith" affect insurance settlements?
Contenido multimedia no disponible por derechos de autor o por acceso restringido. Contacte con la institución para más información.
| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20140015504 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20140509092040.0 | ||
| 008 | 140508e20140303esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a7 | ||
| 100 | 1 | $0MAPA20140008025$aAsmat, Danial P. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aDoes the threat of insurer liability for "Bad Faith" affect insurance settlements?$cDanial P. Asmat, Sharon Tennyson |
| 520 | $aEconomic reasoning predicts that policyholders in states that treat for insurer bad faith in settling claims as a tort should receive higher payments from insurers because of the greater potential damages insurers face in claims disputed in court. We test this hypothesis using data on automobile insurance claims for accidents occurring during 19721997, exploiting differences in states laws and variation in timing of states adoption of bad faith rules to identify the effects of tort liability. We find that the presence of tort liability for insurer bad faith increases settlement amounts and reduces the likelihood that a claim is underpaid. | ||
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g03/03/2014 Volumen 81 Número 1 - marzo 2014 |