Testing for asymmetric information in reinsurance markets

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<title>Testing for asymmetric information in reinsurance markets</title>
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<namePart>Yan, Zhiqiang</namePart>
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<namePart>Hong, Liang</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">Empirical studies on asymmetric information have mainly focused on primary insurance markets, but comparatively little attention has been given to reinsurance markets. This study investigates the existence of asymmetric information by testing for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk in three major reinsurance markets for the period 1995-2000 and finds that (1) asymmetric information problems are present in the private passenger auto liability and homeowners reinsurance markets, but not in the product liability reinsurance market; (2) retention limits are widely utilised to mitigate asymmetric information problems; (3) long-term contracting relationships are either rarely used or not effective in controlling asymmetric information problems.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Zhiqiang Yan, Liang Hong</note>
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<topic>Mercado de reaseguros</topic>
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<topic>Reaseguro</topic>
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<topic>Análisis empírico</topic>
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<topic>Información asimétrica</topic>
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<topic>Riesgo moral</topic>
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<topic>Selección adversa</topic>
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<topic>Obligaciones contractuales</topic>
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<title>Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice</title>
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<publisher>Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1018-5895</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077100215</identifier>
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<text>05/01/2015 Volumen 40 Número 1 - enero 2015 , p. 29-46</text>
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