Costs and benefits of financial regulation : an empirical assessment

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<title>Costs and benefits of financial regulation</title>
<subTitle>: an empirical assessment</subTitle>
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<namePart>Pankoke, David Antonius</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">We analyse the costs and benefits of financial regulation based on a survey of 76 insurers from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Our analysis includes both established and new empirical measures for regulatory costs and benefits. This is the first paper that tries to take costs and benefits combined into account using a latent class regression with covariates. Moreover, we analyse regulatory costs and benefits not only on an industry level, but also at the company level. This allows us to empirically test fundamental principles of financial regulation such as proportionality: the intensity of regulation should reflect the firm-specific amount and complexity of the risk taken. Our findings do not support the proportionality principle; for example, regulatory costs cannot be explained by differences in business complexity. One potential policy implication is that the proportionality principle needs to be more carefully applied to financial regulation.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Martin Eling, David Pankoke</note>
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<topic>Legislación de seguros</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20100024867">
<topic>Regulación económica</topic>
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<topic>Análisis costo-beneficio</topic>
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<topic>Principio de proporcionalidad</topic>
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<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<title>Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice</title>
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<publisher>Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1018-5895</identifier>
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<text>03/10/2016 Volumen 41 Número 4 - octubre 2016 , p. 529-554</text>
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