On The failure (success) of the markets for longevity risk transfer

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      <subfield code="a">MacMinn, Richard D.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">On The failure (success) of the markets for longevity risk transfer</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Richard D. MacMinn, Patrick L. Brockett</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Longevity risk is the chance that people will live longer than expected. Thatpotential increase in life expectancy exposes insurers and pension funds to therisk of not having suf?cient funds to pay a longer stream of annuity bene?tsthan promised. Longevity bonds and forwards provide insurers and pensionfunds with ?nancial market instruments designed to hedge the longevity riskthat these organization face. The European Investment Bank and World Bankhave both discussed longevity bond issues, but those issues have failed due toinsuf?cient demand. Forward contracts have also been created, but thatmarket remains dormant. The extant literature suggests that these failuresmay be due to design or pricing problems. In this article the analysis showsthat the market failure is instead due to a moral hazard problem.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080555016</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Longevidad</subfield>
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      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080591182</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Gerencia de riesgos</subfield>
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      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080260019</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Brockett, Patrick L.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">03/04/2017 Volumen 84 Número S1 - abril 2017 , p. 299-317</subfield>
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