Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market

MAP20180020124

Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market / Patricia A. Robinson, Frank A. Sloan, Lindsey M. Eldred

Sumario: This study quantifies the role of private information in automobile insurance policy choice using data on subjective beliefs, risk preference, reckless driving, the respondent's insurer, and insurance policy characteristics merged with insurer-specific quality ratings distributed by independent organizations. We find a zero correlation between ex post accident risk and insurance coverage, refiecting advantageous selection in policy choice offset by moral hazard. Advantageous selection is partly attributable to insurer sorting on consumer attributes known and used by insurers. Our analysis of insurer sorting reveals that lower-risk drivers on attributes observed by insurers obtain coverage from insurers with higher-quality ratings

En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/06/2018 Volumen 85 Número 2 - junio 2018 , p. 545-575

1. Mercado de seguros . 2. Seguro de automóviles . 3. Coberturas . 4. Riesgo moral . 5. Estados Unidos . I. Sloan, Frank A. . II. Eldred, Lindsey M. . III. Título.