Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect
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<subfield code="a">We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the behavior of independent directors and the effectiveness of their governance role. Using a unique data set, we find a negative relation between D&O insurance and personal board meeting attendance by independent directors and a positive relation between D&O insurance and meeting attendance by authorized representatives. Content analysis of independent director opinion reports indicates that D&O insurance encourages independent directors to behave less responsibly. Insured independent directors are also more likely to be busy. Collectively, D&O insurance reduces the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate governance</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Directors and officers (insurance)</subfield>
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<subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
<subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
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<subfield code="g">03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1013-1054</subfield>
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