Inherent virtue or inevitable evil : the effects of directors' and officers' insurance on firm value
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<title>Inherent virtue or inevitable evil</title>
<subTitle>: the effects of directors' and officers' insurance on firm value</subTitle>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">Whether directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance improves firrn value is a controversial issue. We perform a literature review about the effect of D&O insurance and find mixed results. The proponents of D&O insurance believe it enhances corporate monitoring and improves firm value, while the opponents of D&O insurance argue that it creates a moral hazard problem and diminishes firm value. Against this backdrop, we argue that the trade-off between the monitoring and moral hazard effects depends on the information acquired by the outside directors. Using a sample of listed Canadian firms, we find that (1) a change in D&O insurance coverage has no net effect on a firm's subsequent value when we ignore the information acquired by outside directors, (2) an increase in D&O insurance coverage improves a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are well informed, and (3) an increase in D&O insurance coverage reduces a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are poorly informed. Our findings are robust to endogeneity checks and have important implications for the regulation of D&O insurance</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Derrick W. H. Fung, </note>
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<topic>Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal</topic>
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<topic>Seguro D&O</topic>
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<topic>Directivos de empresas</topic>
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<topic>Riesgo moral</topic>
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<topic>Gerencia de riesgos</topic>
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<topic>Empresas de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Estadísticas</topic>
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<title>Risk management & insurance review</title>
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<publisher>Malden, MA : The American Risk and Insurance Association by Blackwell Publishing, 1999-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1098-1616</identifier>
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<part>
<text>28/09/2018 Tomo 21 Número 2 - 2018 , p. 243-288</text>
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