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Public authority liability and the cost of disasters
Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20190028585
003  MAP
005  20191004144231.0
008  191002e20191001che|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎​MAP‎$b‎​spa‎$d‎​MAP
084  ‎$a‎​911.6
1001 ‎$0‎​MAPA20190013642‎$a‎​Mot, Jef De ‌
24510‎$a‎​Public authority liability and the cost of disasters‎$c‎​Jef De Mot, Michael Faure
520  ‎$a‎​We examine the influence of introducing public authority liability in the context of disasters. In an ideal setting a rule of comparative negligence would incentivise the government to take an optimal amount of care. The citizen, being the residual bearer of the loss, would consequently also take optimal care. However, in the specific context of disasters, public authority liability may backfire and lead to more losses than without such liability. We argue that under some circumstances perverse incentives of citizens may increase with liability. We focus inter alia on (1) the difficulties that may exist to incentivise public authorities through liability rules, (2) the specific characteristics of comparative negligence that may make public authorities liable for the lion's share of the damages, (3) the problem of negative expected value suits and (4) the fact that public authorities may be much more inclined to intervene ex post when damages exceed a threshold.
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080600204‎$a‎​Catástrofes naturales ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080632083‎$a‎​Responsabilidad de la Administración ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20100048047‎$a‎​Negligencia ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080579784‎$a‎​Costes económicos ‌
7001 ‎$0‎​MAPA20080097967‎$a‎​Faure, Michael ‌
7730 ‎$w‎​MAP20077100215‎$t‎​Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice‎$d‎​Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-‎$x‎​1018-5895‎$g‎​01/10/2019 Volumen 44 Número 4 - octubre 2019 , p. 760-783