Insurance fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz world

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<dc:creator>Martin Boyer, M.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Peter, Richard</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2020-03-02</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: In this article, we model a competitive insurance market where policyholders privately have information about their probability of accident ex ante and know the state of the world ex post.We combine costly state verification without commitment and arguments from insurance contracting under adverse selection to characterize the resulting allocations. Insurance fraud convexifies the insurer's zero expected profit condition, which can lead to complete unraveling with low risks dropping out of the market. The standard case, however, involves rationing of low risks, which raises their probability of fraud and their success rate when committing it. As a result, adverse selection increases fraud in the economy. We also show that cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks mitigates the fraud externality. Our results highlight that adverse selection and insurance fraud interact in nontrivial ways and have the potential to aggravate each other </dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/170985.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Fraude en el seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Administración de la empresa de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos matemáticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Fraude</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Insurance fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz world</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 02/03/2020 Volumen 87 Número 1 - marzo 2020 , p. 117-142</dc:relation>
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