Pesquisa de referências

Self-control, effort procrastination, and competitive equilibrium in insurance markets

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
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008  200921e20200901usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎219
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20100003190‎$a‎Ai, Jing
24510‎$a‎Self-control, effort procrastination, and competitive equilibrium in insurance markets‎$c‎Jing Ai, Lin Zhao, Wei Zhu
520  ‎$a‎This article studies consumers' self-control problems in precautionary activities, their contract choices, and the welfare implications in a competitive insurance market. Present bias and consumer naivete both induce consumers to procrastinate or eventually give up precautionary efforts. In consequence, self-control problems disrupt the monotonicity of consumers' indifference curve on contract choices, leading to a pooling equilibrium or an absence of riskcoverage correlation, in addition to the classic result of adverse selection. Compulsory insurance raises all consumers' welfare only in adverse selection, but not in other equilibrium patterns.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080624019‎$a‎Comportamiento del consumidor
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080598358‎$a‎Productos de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080611880‎$a‎Perspectivas del seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584290‎$a‎Contrato de seguro
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20100063170‎$a‎Zhao, Lin
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20200018810‎$a‎Zhu, Wei
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/09/2020 Volumen 87 Número 3 - septiembre 2020 , p. 751-782