Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Self-control, effort procrastination, and competitive equilibrium in insurance markets

MAP20200028970

Self-control, effort procrastination, and competitive equilibrium in insurance markets / Jing Ai, Lin Zhao, Wei Zhu

Sumario: This article studies consumers' self-control problems in precautionary activities, their contract choices, and the welfare implications in a competitive insurance market. Present bias and consumer naivete both induce consumers to procrastinate or eventually give up precautionary efforts. In consequence, self-control problems disrupt the monotonicity of consumers' indifference curve on contract choices, leading to a pooling equilibrium or an absence of riskcoverage correlation, in addition to the classic result of adverse selection. Compulsory insurance raises all consumers' welfare only in adverse selection, but not in other equilibrium patterns

En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/09/2020 Volumen 87 Número 3 - septiembre 2020 , p. 751-782

1. Mercado de seguros . 2. Comportamiento del consumidor . 3. Productos de seguros . 4. Perspectivas del seguro . 5. Contrato de seguro . I. Zhao, Lin . II. Zhu, Wei . III. Título.