Splitting risks in insurance markets with adverse selection

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      <subfield code="a">We characterize the design of insurance schemes when policyholders face several insurable risks in a context of adverse selection. Splitting risks emerges as a feature of second-best Pareto optimality. This may take the form of risk-specific contracts, or of contracts where risks are bundled but subject to differential coverage rules, such as risk-specific copayments combined with a deductible or a cap on coverage.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 997-1033</subfield>
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