Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership

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      <subfield code="a">Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and insurers' risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. Monitoring institutional investors are defined as those that have (a) a long-term investment horizon, (b) large holdings in the investee firm, (c) independence from management, and (d) a large portion of their portfolio invested in the firm. We measure both the level and persistence of monitoring institutional ownership and find a negative relationship between monitoring institutional ownership and an insurer's stock stability and performance during the crisis. Further examination reveals that these firms took more risk before the crisis. Whereas many monitoring institutions exited the insurance market after the crisis, evidence suggests that the remaining institutional investors in the postcrisis period have a longer investment horizon and are active in monitoring and risk management.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Crisis económica</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/06/2021 Volumen 88 Número 2 - junio 2021 , p. 351-380</subfield>
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