The Effect of emission permits and pigouvian taxes on market structure
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000nam a2200000 i 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20070036420 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20160427093103.0 | ||
| 008 | 030131s2001 esp 000|0spa | ||
| 017 | $aM. 54394-2001 | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa | ||
| 084 | $a831 | ||
| 100 | 1 | $0MAPA20080093075$aBuñuel, Miguel | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | $aThe Effect of emission permits and pigouvian taxes on market structure$cMiguel Buñuel |
| 260 | $aMadrid$bFundación Biodiversidad$cD.L. 2001 | ||
| 300 | $a47 p.$c24 cm | ||
| 490 | 1 | $aPapeles de Trabajo sobre Medio Ambiente y Economía = Working Papers on Environment and Economics$v1-2001 | |
| 520 | 8 | $aDifferently from Pigouvian taxes and direct regulation, tradable emission permits can decrease competition in a polluting industry under certain circumstances. Assume a potential entrant who can buy every permit. When permits are given free to current polluters, monopolization occurs if not every polluter foresees it. If foreseen, polluters want to free ride on the entrant's market power, but entry can still occur, although not with certainty. Considering a symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrum with unconditional bids, the prbably of entry decreases as the number of polluters increases. When permits are sold initially, monopolization occurs without more requirements than polluters being financially constrained | |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080612009$aPolítica medioambiental |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080551285$aImpuestos |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080560393$aReglamentos |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080599836$aAgentes contaminantes |
| 710 | 2 | $0MAPA20080446239$aFundación Biodiversidad | |
| 830 | 0 | $0MAPA20080535971$aPapeles de Trabajo sobre Medio Ambiente y Economía = Working Papers on Environment and Economics$v1-2001 |