Asymmetric information problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market : the effect of policy design on loss charasteristics

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      <subfield code="a">Wang, Jennifer L.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Asymmetric information problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">: the effect of policy design on loss charasteristics</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Jennifer L. Wang</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This artice investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan . Using panel data  for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1955 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage , deductible amounts , and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demostrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self- selection mechanisms in policies with diffrent levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Seguro de automóviles</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Empresas de seguros</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Coberturas</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Taiwan</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Risk management and insurance review</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">Risk management and insurance review</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">New York : The American Risk and Insurance Association</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">Vol. 7, nº 1 Spring 2004 ; p. 53-71</subfield>
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