Contracting incentives and compensation for property-liability insurer executives

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<dc:creator>Grace, Elisabeth</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2004-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">This article examines several hypotheses about the  structure and level of compensation for 103 property-liability chief executive officers (CEOs) from 1995 through 1997. The greater the level of the firm risk and the larger the firm, the greater the use of incentive compensation</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/57351.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estudios</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de riesgo</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Directivos de empresas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Incentivos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de daños patrimoniales</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Análisis empírico</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Contracting incentives and compensation for property-liability insurer executives</dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 71, number 1, March 2004 ;  p. 285-307</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>