Increasing the number of guards at nuclear power plants

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      <subfield code="a">The article is about increasing the guards numbers at nuclear plants. Sheer numbers are not in themselves a strong guarantee. Instead, what clearly needs to be done is to assess the cultures of nuclear installations to find out just how robuts those cultures are. We need to provide support to those plants that exhibit a generative culture, so they can better do their job. As investigations over the last decade have shown, there are a plenty of nuclear installations that are anything but generative. Adding more guards to such plants is not likely to improve much of anything</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">nº 4, August 2004 ; p. 959-961</subfield>
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