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Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation

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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080177768‎$a‎Saito, Kuniyoshi
24510‎$a‎Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation‎$c‎Kuniyoshi Saito
5208 ‎$a‎This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation, which prohibits insurance companies from considering some attributes of drivers in setting premiums. Using an individual data set from a heavily regulated automobile insurance market, author arrives to a couple of conclusions
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080603779‎$a‎Seguro de automóviles
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
65001‎$0‎MAPA20080553852‎$a‎Daño moral
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080599096‎$a‎Selección de riesgos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080571566‎$a‎Casos prácticos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080539047‎$a‎Japón
7404 ‎$a‎The Journal of risk and insurance
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Orlando‎$g‎Volume 73, number 1, June 2006 ; p. 335-356