Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000nab a2200000 i 4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20071508125</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20080418125803.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="007">hzruuu---uuuu</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">060629e20060601usa||||    | |00010|eng d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">322</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080177768</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Saito, Kuniyoshi</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Kuniyoshi Saito</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation, which prohibits insurance companies from considering some attributes of drivers in setting premiums. Using an individual data set from a heavily regulated automobile insurance market, author arrives to a couple of conclusions</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080590567</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Empresas de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080603779</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro de automóviles</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080586294</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Mercado de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080553852</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Daño moral</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080599096</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Selección de riesgos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080571566</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Casos prácticos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080539047</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Japón</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="740" ind1="4" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000727</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Orlando</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">Volume 73, number 1, June 2006 ;  p. 335-356</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>