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Seção: ArtigosTítulo: Regulatory competition and life insurance solvency regulation in the European Union and United States / Philip Booth and Alan D. MorrisonAutor: Booth, PhilipNotas: The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance literature. In this paper authors discuss some justifications that have been advanced for regulation and argue that they are not persuasive. The most rigorous arguments in favor of the regulation of life insurance companies are as follows. First, regulation can prevent the adverse affects of information asymmetries in markets fo illiquid contracts. Second, regulation can be used to ensure that insurers commit to contracts. In the case of life insurers these contracts may be incomplete, and it may be difficult to determine the terms of the contracts objectively; this is particularly so with U.K. with-profit contracts, for example. Finally, the authors propose a method of moving toward such a regulatory framework starting from the current regulatory institutions in the United States and the European UnionRegistros relacionados: En: North American Actuarial Journal. - Schaumburg, Illinois. - Volume 11, number 4, October 2007 ; p. 23-41Materia / lugar / evento: Empresas de segurosControl de segurosSolvenciaControl de entidades financierasContabilidadEuropa OccidentalEstados UnidosSeguro de vidaUnión EuropeaReino UnidoAdministración de la empresa de segurosOtros autores: Morrison, Alan D. Merrill, Craig Morrison, Philip Outras classificações: 214Direitos: In Copyright (InC)