Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Asymmetric Information in the market for automobile insurance : evidence from Germany

Notas: Sumario: Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is crucial to test for asymmetric information in specific insurance markets. In this article, we analyze a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric information depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered, which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006), we also test whether drivers have realistic expectations concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure.Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2014 Volumen 81 Número 4 - diciembre 2014 , p. 781-801Materia / lugar / evento: Gerencia de riesgos Mercado de seguros Información asimétrica Seguro de automóviles Factores de riesgo Modelos estadísticos Estudios comparativos Contrato de seguro Alemania Otros autores: Winter, Joachim
Hagmayer, Steffen
Otras clasificaciones: 322

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