Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Balance sheet structure and the managerial-dicretion hypothesis : an exploratory empirical study of New Zealand life insurance companies

MAP20090037205

Balance sheet structure and the managerial-dicretion hypothesis : an exploratory empirical study of New Zealand life insurance companies / by Mike Adams

Sumario: The article discusses New Zealand life insurance company data for 1991 using canonical correlation analysis. Corporate shareholders of New Zealand-based stock companies generally have more widely-held voting rights than their subsidiaries. Even so, compared with the atomistic nature of policyholder ownership in mutuals, parent stock companies are much more closely controlled by their shareholders. Indeed, H. Demsetz argues that shareholdings are not so diffusely owned as is often supposed. Moreover, as shareholders in stock companies have the option to sell their residual claims and that this can enhance concentration of ownership. The option of trading residual rights does not exist to the same degree in mutuals. In other words, it is the absence of the threat of concentrated control rather than the absence of control per se which makes the contracting incentive conflicts between policyholders and managers so acute in the mutual form. Clearly, policyholders with participatory rights (with-profits) policies will also have an interest in short-term profitability inasmuch as it affects their annual bonuses

En: Accounting & Finance. - Vol. 35, Issue 1, May 1995 ; p. 21-45

1. Empresas de seguros . 2. Seguro de vida . 3. Management . 4. Estructura organizativa . 5. Accionistas . 6. Control interno . 7. Nueva Zelanda . I. Title.