Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks

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      <subfield code="c">Haitao Yin, Alex Pfaff and Howard Kunreuther</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can  achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments-ex post fines an dris management mandates with ex ante fines-do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatroy agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm.</subfield>
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