Centro de Documentación de Fundación MAPFRE - The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups

Publication: Geneva : International Labour Organization, 2012Series: (Microinsurance paper ; 22)Notes: Sumario: This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsuranceMateria / lugar / evento: Microseguros Seguro colectivo de salud Sistema individual Tanzania Otros autores: Kramer, Berber
International Labour Organization
Micro Insurance Innovation Facility
Secondary series: Microinsurance paper ; 22 Other categories: 34

Rights: In Copyright (InC)

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