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The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups

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MAP20130037448
Janssens, Wendy
The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups / Wendy Janssens and Berber Kramer. — Geneva : International Labour Organization, 2012
(Microinsurance paper ; 22)
Sumario: This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance
1. Microseguros . 2. Seguro colectivo de salud . 3. Sistema individual . 4. Tanzania . I. Kramer, Berber . II. International Labour Organization . III. Micro Insurance Innovation Facility . IV. Microinsurance paper ; 22 . V. Title.