Asymmetric Information in the market for automobile insurance : evidence from Germany

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Spindler, Martin</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Winter, Joachim</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Hagmayer, Steffen</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2014-12-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is crucial to test for asymmetric information in specific insurance markets. In this article, we analyze a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric information depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered, which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006), we also test whether drivers have realistic expectations concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/150743.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Gerencia de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Información asimétrica</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de automóviles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Factores de riesgo</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos estadísticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estudios comparativos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Alemania</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Asymmetric Information in the market for automobile insurance : evidence from Germany</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2014 Volumen 81 Número 4 - diciembre 2014 , p. 781-801</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Alemania</dc:coverage>
</rdf:Description>
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