Moral hazard and advantegeous selection in private disability insurance

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<title>Moral hazard and advantegeous selection in private disability insurance</title>
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<dateIssued encoding="marc">2018</dateIssued>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">We analyse asymmetric information in private long-term disability insurance. Using the elimination period as a measure of coverage, we examine the correlation between risk and coverage. Our unique data set includes both group and individual insurance. We are thus able to disentangle moral hazard and selection in individual insurance by controlling for moral hazard using group insurance. Our results provide evidence of moral hazard and advantageous selection in the individual private long-tenn disability insurance market. Thus, we provide guidelines for policymakers and insurers on the presence of asymmetric information in disability insurance and on future attempts to reduce it. </abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Sebastian Soika</note>
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<topic>Previsión privada</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080603793">
<topic>Seguro de incapacidad</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080564049">
<topic>Riesgo moral</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080606695">
<topic>Información asimétrica</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080562144">
<topic>Discapacidad</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080603786">
<topic>Seguro de dependencia</topic>
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<title>Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice</title>
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<publisher>Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1018-5895</identifier>
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<text>01/01/2018 Volumen 43 Número 1 - enero 2018 , p. 97-125</text>
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