Linear versus nonlinear allocation rules in risk sharing under financial faimess

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<dc:creator>Schumacher, Johannes M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2018-09-03</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: In a risk exchange, participants trade a privately owned risk for a share in a pool. If participants agree on a valuation rule, it can be decided whether or not, according to the given rule, these trades take place at equal value. If equality of values holds for all participants, then the exchange is said to be "financially fair". It has been shown by Buhlmann and Jewell (1979) that, undermild assumptions, the constraint of financial fairness singles out a unique solution among the set of all Pareto efficient risk exchanges. In this paper, we find that an analogous statement is true if we limit ourselves to linear exchanges.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/166088.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Métodos estadísticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgo financiero</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos de estados financieros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Gerencia de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Linear versus nonlinear allocation rules in risk sharing under financial faimess</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Astin bulletin. - Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association = ISSN 0515-0361. - 03/09/2018 Volumen 48 Número 3 - septiembre 2018 , p. 995-1024</dc:relation>
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