Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Shi, Peng</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Zhang, Wei</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Boucher, Jean-Philippe</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2018-12-03</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: This article examines moral hazard in the context of dynamic contracting in automobile insurance. Economic theory shows that experience rating of insurers results in state dependence of driving behavior under moral hazard. The empirical analysis is performed using a longitudinal data set from a Canadian automobile insurer. We employ dynamic nonlinear panel data models to distinguish the structural and spurious state dependence, and thus moral hazard and selection on unobservables. As a measure of the riskiness of driving, we consider the frequency, the number, as well as the cost of claims for the policyholder. We find that the state dependence in claim cost reflects both structural and spurious relationships, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. However, the state dependence in claim occurrence is solely due to unobserved heterogeneity</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/166507.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de automóviles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgo moral</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Accidentes de tráfico</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Información asimétrica</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos predictivos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estadísticas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Canadá</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 939-958</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Canadá</dc:coverage>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>