The Liability regime of insurance pools and its impact on pricing

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      <subfield code="a">The Liability regime of insurance pools and its impact on pricing</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Lukas Reichel</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This work formally derives fairly priced premiums for the policyholder of an insurance pool and the risk-adequate equity contributions of the pool insurers' equity holders in a contingent claims approach. The approach distinguishes between two liability regimes: joint liability and several liability. These regimes regulate the pool's indemnification when one or more of the pool insurers cannot meet their full obligations because of insolvency. Joint liability is deduced to be the preferable regime for the policyholder in cost-savings terms if corporate income taxation is introduced as a market friction. This regime advantage vanishes if the pool insurers' asset correlation is substantial or if their risk sharing becomes unbalanced. Additionally, we address risk-shifting problems and their regime-dependent effects on both stakeholder groups.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Método de valoración contingente</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">03/12/2018 Tomo 22 Número 4 - 2018 , p. 533-553</subfield>
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