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Improving risk sharing and borrower incentives in mortgage design

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
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001  MAP20200004806
003  MAP
005  20200221140203.0
008  200217e20191202usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎eng‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎921.94
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20200003410‎$a‎Mei, Yuchen
24510‎$a‎Improving risk sharing and borrower incentives in mortgage design‎$c‎Yuchen Mei, Phelim Boyle and Johnny Siu-Hang Li
520  ‎$a‎In a traditional fixed rate mortgage, the borrower pays a fixed amount each period regardless of the value of the mortgaged property. One problem with this contract is that the borrower is less willing to pay when the house value falls. This was clearly seen in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath when mortgage default rates and foreclosures skyrocketed as the housing market crashed. A more efficient contract design should link payments to house prices so that the borrower's incentive to pay is not undermined by a decline in property value. In addition, this design can save the lender the deadweight foreclosure costs. In this article, we examine two proposed index linked mortgages that have this risk sharing feature. We analyze the effect of both designs on borrower incentives in a multiperiod setting.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080610319‎$a‎Distribución de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080554774‎$a‎Incentivos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080551193‎$a‎Hipotecas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080607876‎$a‎Préstamos hipotecarios
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080566784‎$a‎Participación
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080595548‎$a‎Contratos de crédito
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20130000817‎$a‎Boyle, Phelim
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20100040126‎$a‎Siu-Hang Li, Johnny
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000239‎$t‎North American actuarial journal‎$d‎Schaumburg : Society of Actuaries, 1997-‎$x‎1092-0277‎$g‎02/12/2019 Tomo 23 Número 4 - 2019 , p. 485-511