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Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20200040033
003  MAP
005  20201223180209.0
008  201223e20201201usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎7
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20200024330‎$a‎Lay, Margaret J.
24510‎$a‎Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk‎$c‎Margaret J. Lay
520  ‎$a‎This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080552114‎$a‎Pensiones
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080558970‎$a‎Inversiones
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20180004223‎$a‎Regulación
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 935-968