Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives : theory and evidence

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24500‎$a‎Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives‎$b‎: theory and evidence‎$c‎Raimond Maurer...[et al.]
520  ‎$a‎Many Americans claim Social Security benefits early, though this e aves them with lower monthly payments throughout retirement. We build a lifecycle model that closely tracks claiming patterns under rules, and we use it to predict claiming delays if, by delaying benefits, people were to receive a lump sum instead of an annuity. We predict that current early claimers would defer claiming by a year given actuarially fair lump sums, and the predictions conform with respondents' answers to a strategic survey about the lump sum. In other words, such a reform could provide an avenue for encouraging delayed retirement without benefit cuts or tax increases. Moreover, many people would still defer claiming even for smaller lump sums.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080578107‎$a‎Seguridad Social
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080552114‎$a‎Pensiones
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20200019183‎$a‎Anualidad variable
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080550592‎$a‎Encuestas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080554927‎$a‎Jubilación
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080662974‎$a‎Maurer, Raimond H.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 5-27