Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives : theory and evidence

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<dc:creator>Maurer, Raimond H.</dc:creator>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Many Americans claim Social Security benefits early, though this e aves them with lower monthly payments throughout retirement. We build a lifecycle model that closely tracks claiming patterns under rules, and we use it to predict claiming delays if, by delaying benefits, people were to receive a lump sum instead of an annuity. We predict that current early claimers would defer claiming by a year given actuarially fair lump sums, and the predictions conform with respondents' answers to a strategic survey about the lump sum. In other words, such a reform could provide an avenue for encouraging delayed retirement without benefit cuts or tax increases. Moreover, many people would still defer claiming even for smaller lump sums.</dc:description>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">In Copyright (InC) - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguridad Social</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Pensiones</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Anualidad variable</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Encuestas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Jubilación</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives : theory and evidence</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 5-27</dc:relation>