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Catastrophe risk, insurance and terrorism

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      <subfield code="a">Ericson, Richard V.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Catastrophe risk, insurance and terrorism</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This article empirically investigates how the terrorism activity of September 11, 2001, was addressed by de insurance industry and government in the United States. It shows that the insurance system worked reasonably well in compensating losses suffered, albeit with various tribulations. It also demonstrates that the insurance industry, along with government as the ultimate risk manager, imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism insurance coverage in many contexts. The findings challenge many of Ulrich Beck's contentions about catastrophe risk and insurability. At the same time, they indicate the fragility of the insurance system</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Terrorismo</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Doyle, Aaron</subfield>
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      <subfield code="d">London</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">Economy and Society</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">vol. 33, nº 2, Mayo 2004 ; p. 135-173</subfield>
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