Life insurance and life settlements : the case for health-contingent cash surrender values

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<subfield code="a">Fang, Hanming</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Life insurance and life settlements</subfield>
<subfield code="b">: the case for health-contingent cash surrender values </subfield>
<subfield code="c">Hanming Fang, Edward Kung</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">We investigate why life insurance policies in practice either do not have a cash surrender value (CSV), or have CSVs that are small and are not adjusted for health status. We show that including health contingent CSVs in a life insurance contract causes a dynamic commitment problem, which makes it more costly up front for policyholders to purchase long-term contracts (because some poor risks who would otherwise have lapsed can and will now capture the CSV instead). To the extent that life insurance policyholders' incomes tend to increase over the course of the policy, policyholders are not willing to accept higher ex ante premium costs in return for the extra liquidity provided by the CSV. Because health-contingent CSVs act in a similar way to a life settlement market, we also study the life insurers' equilibrium choice of CSVs in the presence of a life settlement market. We find that optimally chosen CSVs can partially mitigate the consumer welfare loss caused by the settlement market (as in Daily, Hendel, and Lizzeri, 2008), but only if the CSVs are allowed to be contingent on health status.</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Seguro de vida</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Contrato de seguro</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Derecho de rescate</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Operaciones garantizadas a medio y largo plazo</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Kung, Edward </subfield>
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<subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
<subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
<subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
<subfield code="g">02/03/2020 Volumen 87 Número 1 - marzo 2020 , p. 7-39</subfield>