Centro de Documentación de Fundación MAPFRE - Splitting risks in insurance markets with adverse selection

Notas: Sumario: We characterize the design of insurance schemes when policyholders face several insurable risks in a context of adverse selection. Splitting risks emerges as a feature of second-best Pareto optimality. This may take the form of risk-specific contracts, or of contracts where risks are bundled but subject to differential coverage rules, such as risk-specific copayments combined with a deductible or a cap on coverage.Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 997-1033Materia / lugar / evento: Mercado de seguros Selección adversa Riesgo asegurable Coberturas Gerencia de riesgos Otras clasificaciones: 7

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