Centro de Documentación de Fundación MAPFRE - Directors and officers liability insurance and default risk

Notas: Sumario: This paper investigates the effects of directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance on default risk. Using unique panel data of non-financial listed firms in Taiwan from 2010 to 2017, the empirical results indicate that D&O insurance exerts a significantly positive influence on firms' expected default frequency (EDF), controlling for the endogeneity of D&O insurance coverage and fixed effects. Further analyses reveal that such an effect exists particularly among firms with a high D&O insurance coverage ratio. Firms with D&O insurance have higher default risk than those without. Our findings differ from those in the existing literature by showing that D&O insurance coverage reflects firms' EDF and by capturing more insight on firms' EDF (market value, stock return volatility and firm asset volatility). The evidence indicates that D&O insurance may serve as a real-time, publicly observable signal of default risk for insurers and investors, enabling better contracting and risk management.

Registros relacionados: En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 04/04/2022 Volumen 47 Número 2 - abril 2022 , p. 378-408Materia / lugar / evento: Directors and officers (insurance) Gerencia de riesgos Otras clasificaciones: 7

Derechos: In Copyright (InC)

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