Costs and benefits of financial regulation : an empirical assessment

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      <subfield code="a">Costs and benefits of financial regulation</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">We analyse the costs and benefits of financial regulation based on a survey of 76 insurers from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Our analysis includes both established and new empirical measures for regulatory costs and benefits. This is the first paper that tries to take costs and benefits combined into account using a latent class regression with covariates. Moreover, we analyse regulatory costs and benefits not only on an industry level, but also at the company level. This allows us to empirically test fundamental principles of financial regulation such as proportionality: the intensity of regulation should reflect the firm-specific amount and complexity of the risk taken. Our findings do not support the proportionality principle; for example, regulatory costs cannot be explained by differences in business complexity. One potential policy implication is that the proportionality principle needs to be more carefully applied to financial regulation.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">03/10/2016 Volumen 41 Número 4 - octubre 2016 , p. 529-554</subfield>
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