Búsqueda

The Effect of emission permits and pigouvian taxes on market structure

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000nam a2200000 i 4500
001  MAP20070036420
003  MAP
005  20160427093103.0
008  030131s2001 esp 000|0spa
017  ‎$a‎M. 54394-2001
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa
084  ‎$a‎831
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080093075‎$a‎Buñuel, Miguel
24514‎$a‎The Effect of emission permits and pigouvian taxes on market structure‎$c‎Miguel Buñuel
260  ‎$a‎Madrid‎$b‎Fundación Biodiversidad‎$c‎D.L. 2001
300  ‎$a‎47 p.‎$c‎24 cm
4901 ‎$a‎Papeles de Trabajo sobre Medio Ambiente y Economía = Working Papers on Environment and Economics‎$v‎1-2001
5208 ‎$a‎Differently from Pigouvian taxes and direct regulation, tradable emission permits can decrease competition in a polluting industry under certain circumstances. Assume a potential entrant who can buy every permit. When permits are given free to current polluters, monopolization occurs if not every polluter foresees it. If foreseen, polluters want to free ride on the entrant's market power, but entry can still occur, although not with certainty. Considering a symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrum with unconditional bids, the prbably of entry decreases as the number of polluters increases. When permits are sold initially, monopolization occurs without more requirements than polluters being financially constrained
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080612009‎$a‎Política medioambiental
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080551285‎$a‎Impuestos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080560393‎$a‎Reglamentos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080599836‎$a‎Agentes contaminantes
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20080446239‎$a‎Fundación Biodiversidad
830 0‎$0‎MAPA20080535971‎$a‎Papeles de Trabajo sobre Medio Ambiente y Economía = Working Papers on Environment and Economics‎$v‎1-2001